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R e s p o n d e n t ' s A n s w e r Brief
Petitioner, Lorin Blauer, appeals to this Court for the fourth time, this
time challenging actions by the Utah Department of Workforce Services
(DWS) that occurred prior to Petitioner's July 2004 termination, which this
Court previously upheld on procedural grounds.

Statement of Jurisdiction
The CSRB possesses general jurisdiction to consider alleged personnel
rule violations under Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-202(l)(a) (West 2009). This
Court possesses jurisdiction to review a final agency action under Utah Code
Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(a) (West 2009). But because Petitioner lacked a private
right of action to substantively remedy alleged disability discrimination at the
CSRB, it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to order any specific relief
regarding those claims. See Utah Admin Code R. 137-1-5(1) (2001); see also
Utah Ann. § 34A-5-107(15) (West 2003) and § 67-19-32 (West Supp. 2003).
Consequently, as to those claims, this Court's subject matter jurisdiction is
also limited. See Horn v. Utah Dep't of Pub. Safety, 962 P.2d 95, 99 (Utah
App. 1998) (when matter falls without court's jurisdiction, it possesses only
authority to dismiss it).
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I

Counter Statement of Issues Presented
1. N o P r i v a t e R i g h t of A c t i o n
A. Whether Petitioner possesses a private right of action to
substantively remedy alleged disability discrimination at the CSRB.
B. Whether the CSRB possesses subject matter jurisdiction to
substantively remedy a disability discrimination claim that the Utah
Legislature has reserved to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Utah AntiDiscrimination and Labor Division (UALD).
Standard of Review
Interpretation of a private right of action or remedy presents a question
of law that this Court reviews for correctness. See Buckner v. Kennard, 2004
UT 78, f 41, 99 P.3d 842, 853 (whether statute provides private right of
action presents question of statutory interpretation). The scope of the CSRB's
subject matter jurisdiction also presents a question of law this Court reviews
for correctness, giving no deference to the hearing officer or Board below. See
Blauer v. Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2005 UT App 488, f 14, 128 P.3d 1204
(Blatter I); Blauer v. Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2007 UT App. 280, f 4, 167
P.3d 1102 (Blauer II).
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2. J o b P e r f o r m a n c e P a r a m e t e r s
Whether the CSRB correctly determined that DWS sufficiently defined
Petitioner's job performance parameters during face-to-face meetings between
Petitioner and his supervisor.
Standard of Review
This issue involves a mixed question of fact and law that the Court
reviews deferentially to determine whether the decision was reasonable and
rational. See Sorge v. Office of the Utah Attorney Gen., 2006 UT App. 2, f 17,
128 P.3d 566.
3. N o Written R e p r i m a n d
Whether the CSRB correctly determined that a memorandum that
altered Petitioner's job assignment, but not his pay, benefits, or job title did
not constitute a written reprimand, and further, that this Court's decision
upholding that change of assignment as a proper extension of Petitioner's job
functions was res judicata on Petitioner's claim before the CSRB,
Standard of Review
Whether the job assignment memorandum constitutes a written
reprimand issue has the same standard of review as Issue 2., above. Whether
res judicata bars this action presents a question of law that the

-3-
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Court reviews for correctness. Maoris & Assocs., Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 2000
UT 93, f 17, 16 P.3d 1214.
4. P r o p e r R e j e c t i o n of Rebuttal T e s t i m o n y
Whether the hearing officer appropriately precluded Petitioner's
rebuttal testimony that was irrelevant and argumentative?
Standard of Review
This Court reviews a challenge to the admission of rebuttal testimony
for an abuse of discretion. See Green v. Louder, 2001 UT 62, f 19, 29 P.3d
638.
Preservation of the Issues
Petitioner raised the first three issues in his motion for reconsideration.
R 27-149. This Court determined that Petitioner adequately preserved those
claims and directed that they be set for hearing. Blauer v. Dep't of Workforce
Servs., 2008 UT App. 84 (Blauer III). Those claims were heard at a Step 5
evidentiary hearing and were later reviewed at Step 6. R. 1566-1576; 19461974.
Petitioner failed to advance the fourth issue (rebuttal testimony) to the
CSRB at Step 6 and he has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies or
to preserve that issue for review on appeal.

-4Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Determinative Statutes and Rules
The determinative statutes and rules are stated in the body of this
brief. DWS has attached a relevant copy of Utah Admin. Code R. 477-15 at
addendum A.

Statement of the Case
Petitioner seeks judicial review of a final agency action that dismissed
three, alleged personnel rule violation claims. In part, the CSRB dismissed
Petitioner's disability discrimination claims because he failed to establish
that DWS violated its personnel rules, and also, because the CSRB lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over those claims. The CSRB also found that DWS
appropriately defined Petitioner's job parameters during several face-to-face
meetings between Petitioner and his supervisor, and that a change of
assignment memorandum that Petitioner's supervisor issued in September
2003 did not constitute a written reprimand, but was a proper allocation of
employee resources. 1 Petitioner asks this Court to reverse those decisions
and to order specific relief. DWS maintains the Court should affirm them.

1

Petitioner also contends that the Step 5 hearing officer erred when he
precluded Petitioner's irrelevant and argumentative rebuttal testimony.
Petitioner did not advance that claim on Step 6 and he therefore failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies regarding that claim. See infra,
discussion at p .
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Statement of Facts
Procedural History
This appeal stems from Petitioner' s September 2003 grievance and
claim that DWS demoted him when Petitioner' s supervisor changed his dayto-day job assignment. R. 13-17. This Court previously upheld that job
assignment as a proper allocation of employee resources, see Blauer /, 2005
UT App. 488, f 32, 128 P.3d 1204, but the Court also remanded six personnel
rule violation claims for a hearing on the merits. See Blauer III, 2008 UT
App. 84 (unpublished). A hearing officer held that hearing for four days in
2009. Dissatisfied with that result and with the CSRB's final agency action
that upheld the hearing officer's findings and conclusions as reasonable,
rationale and supported by substantial evidence, Petitioner seeks further
review here.
Petitioner's Position, Performance Plans and 2001/ 2002 Performance
Evaluations
Petitioner became employed by DWS in 1980, where he worked as legal
counsel III until his termination in November 2004. R. 2138 at 600.
Petitioner understood that his job duties would not remain the same in
perpetuity. Id. Throughout, Petitioner's job duties waxed and waned
depending upon DWS's needs and included contracts, garnishments,
-6Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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bankruptcies, subplan reviews, prosecution board, and conducting
unemployment insurance hearings. R. 2138 at 600-602; Blauer I, 2005 UT
App. 488, f 2.
Petitioner received annual performance reviews 1999-2003, and he
received updated performance plans in 1999-2000 and 2000-2001. Those
plans stated that conducting administrative hearings comprised a "core duty"
of Petitioner's position. R. 2138 at 606, 608; 2140, Exs. A-2 and G-34.2
Virginia Smith (Smith), Petitioner's then-supervisor rated his job
performance and gave Petitioner a "successful" performance appraisal. Smith
noted, however, that Petitioner was falling asleep during work hours, R. 2140
Ex G-13, and told Petitioner that if "a medical condition" caused him to fall
asleep he "need[ed] to contact the DWS ADA coordinator, Leslee

2

In 2005, this Court found that DWS consistently assigned Petitioner - as
well as other legal counsel III - to preside over administrative hearings.
Blauer /, 2005 UT App. at f 8. Further, the Court determined
[t]he number of weeks DWS assigned [Petitioner] to hearings and
the number of weeks [Petitioner] held hearings varied each year.
For instance, in 2000, [Petitioner] presided over six to twenty
hearings a week for thirty-six weeks, with most weeks falling
between eleven and eighteen hearings. In 2003, DWS assigned
[Petitioner] to three to fourteen hearings a week for nineteen
weeks, with eight being the typical number of hearings per week.
Id. at f 9.
-7Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Hintze, to discuss any possible accommodations needed." Id. at 2. Petitioner
did not seek an accommodation. R. 2138 at 613.
And though she rated Petitioner's overall performance as successful,
Smith also noted her concern that Petitioner was often hard to find, that he
often worked with his door shut; and that although Petitioner always did
what he was asked to do, he did little to "go beyond that" and as a result was
"not fully integrated into DWS." R. 2140, Ex. G-13 at p. 2. Petitioner did not
grieve or respond to those comments, but he indicated that he agreed. Id.,
Ex. G-13 at p. 3.
Petitioner did not receive an updated performance plan in 2001-02. He
was also not aware and did not complain of that fact. R. 2138 at 613-14.
Tani Downing (Downing) replaced Smith as Director of the Division of
Adjudication for the Department of Workforce Services in January 2002, and
became Petitioner's new supervisor. R. 2138 at 614; R. 2139 at 761.
Downing first reviewed Petitioner's job performance in June 2002.
Downing gave Petitioner a "successful" performance rating, but she also noted
that he continued to fall asleep during work hours, and that Petitioner was
not "carrying the workload that [his] co-attorneys [carried]." R. 2140, Ex. G14. In response, Petitioner reported that falling asleep was "not a medical
condition . . . just something that happens." R. 2140 Ex G-15 at 2.
-8Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Respecting his workload, Petitioner wrote:
I consider the Performance Evaluation process now utilized to be
flawed and demoralizing. To help solve the problem, since I best
understand my job and the dynamic fluctuations of my workload,
I will conduct an analysis of my position and identify the
elements of the job, reasonable standards of performance and
criteria for evaluating my performance for my supervisor's
consideration. I will then meet with my supervisor to discuss a
resolution. In the meantime, I appreciate my weekly meetings
with Tani to discuss my work assignments thereby helping her
understand what I do.
Id. Petitioner did not seek an accommodation or complete an analysis of his
position and performance criteria. R. 2138 at 617.
Petitioner's 2003 Job Duties and Performance
In the subsequent year, the workload for all agency legal counsel
increased. R. 2138 at 618, 619; 2139 at 765 - 773; 2140 Ex A-25. Petitioner
did not know the size of the caseloads carried by his peers. R. 2136 at 83-84.
Petitioner continued to meet weekly with Downing during this time to
discuss his job assignments and performance. R. 2136 at 209. In March and
April 2003, Downing reallocated part of Petitioner's job functions to other
counsel, and in March 2003, she assigned Petitioner to conduct eight
administrative hearings per week. R. 2136 at 227, 246.3

Downing testified that she first assigned Petitioner to conduct ten hearings
per week, but that he immediately complained that was "too many" and
Downing reduced the assignment to eight hearings per week. R. 2139 at 781.
-9Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Downing next reviewed Petitioner's job performance in June 2003, and
gave him an "unsuccessful" job rating because:
Your workload is still significantly less than your peers who have
had to pick up some of your workload. You have indicated that
you are unable to perform a commensurate workload as your
peers because of a health reason. But you have not gotten an
ADA accommodation despite our many discussions that if this
health issue is affecting you in this manner you needed to get [it].
Otherwise, you are expected to perform a full workload . . . .
Lorin, I have tried to work with you this past year to help you be
successful. I had hoped that your performance could be increased
through informal meetings and discussions. We have met often,
and for some time weekly. We have discussed your need to
become more efficient with your time and assignments and carry
more of your share of the workload.
2140 Ex G-16 at 2.
At that meeting, Petitioner presented Downing with a June 2004 letter
from Petitioner's physician. R. 2140, Ex. G 2 1 ; 2137 at 301. Downing did not
read or accept the letter, but she took Petitioner to meet with Chuck Butler,
DWS's ADA coordinator, and advised Petitioner that if he believed he
required an ADA accommodation, he needed to seek that from Mr. Butler, not
from Downing. R. 2137 at 301; 2138 at 493-94. Petitioner began the process
of seeking an ADA accommodation that day. See infra, Facts at pp. 14-17.
Petitioner also complained to the Workforce Appeals Board chair about this
assignment, telling her that if he had to conduct more administrative
hearings, Petitioner would not be able to complete his board work. Id. 78182.
-10Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Petitioner timely grieved that performance appraisal. R. 2140 Ex G-17,
and challenged his "unsuccessful" classification and also complained that he
did not have a current performance plan in place. Id. at 5. That grievance
did not express the need for a disability accommodation or state that
Petitioner was unable to work due to a medical condition:
My concern, however, in this response is not about reasonable
accommodation as I can - and have been - performing the essential
functions of my position at a highly successful l e v e l . . .
Id. a t l .
Downing gave Petitiioner an updated 2003-2004 performance plan two
days later. Petitioner agreed that plan was substantively the same as his
prior performance plans, R. 2138 at 626, and also that his receipt of that plan
resolved Petitioner's complaint that he did not have a current performance
plan in place. Id at 656; 657.
Downing rejected Petitioner's request to reverse her "unsuccessful"
rating. R. 2140 Ex G-33. Petitioner advanced his grievance to Step 4.
While that grievance was pending, Petitioner and his advocate Tom
Cantrell (Cantrell) met with Downing and Joanne Campbell, a Human
Resource Specialist, on August 20 to discuss ways to alter Petitioner's job
assignment. R. 2140 Ex G-32; 2139 at 903. That discussion occurred at
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Petitioner's request and was not part of a corrective action plan. R. 2139 at
908.
The same day, Cantrell emailed Downing to thank her for the
"productive and helpful meeting." R. 2140, Ex. A-4. Cantrell stated that
Petitioner was "not enthused about the idea of becoming a full time ALJ," but
maintained that opinion was based not on concern over a reasonable
accommodation, but because Petitioner did not believe that assignment would
"utilize his highest certifications, qualifications, [or] skill level. . ." Id,
Downing responded on August 27, 2003, in a memorandum that recounted
the ongoing discussion regarding Petitioner's job assignment and that stated
that Downing would not alter Petitioner's job assignment until Butler
reached a decision on Petitioner's application for ADA Accommodation. R.
2140ExA-5.
On September 5, DWS's executive director, Raylene Ireland, granted
Petitioner's grievance and elevated his performance appraisal two points to
"successful." R. 2140 Ex G-39. Ireland remarked that she was giving
Petitioner "the benefit of the doubt" based on Petitioner's claim that due to
his lack of an updated performance plan, Petitioner also lacked guidance
respecting performance standards and expectations. R. 2140 Ex G-39 at 1, 2.
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Ireland made clear that it was Petitioner's supervisor's responsibility to
determine "the best utilization of [Petitioner's] skills for [his] own good as
well as for the good of the department." Id. at 2. Ireland issued her Step 4
decision the same day that Chuck Butler denied Petitioner's ADA
accommodation request. Ireland was not aware that Petitioner had sought
that accommodation. R. 2139 at 839.
Petitioner did not appeal Ireland's grievance determination. R.2139 at
840.
Petitioner's Application for ADA Accommodation
Petitioner was free to submit any information that he desired in
support of his accommodation request. R. 2138 at 662. Petitioner sought and
submitted letters from his family physician, Dr. Dennis Peterson (Dr.
Peterson), including a July 26 letter in which Dr. Peterson responded to
questions posed by Chuck Butler. R 2140 Ex G-22.4 Dr. Peterson submitted
other letters at Petitioner's request, R 2140, Exs G-21 and G-23, but testified
that he was not aware of the purpose of those letters, or whether anyone at
DWS received them. R. 2137 at 406, 414.
In each letter, Dr. Peterson described Petitioner's physical limitations
and also suggested ways in which he believed those limitations could be
4

Dr. Peterson also spoke by phone with Chuck Butler. R.
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"accommodated." In part, Dr. Peterson diagnosed Petitioner as suffering from
obstructive sleep apnea, sciatica, and coronary artery disease. R. 2140 Ex. G22. Respecting Petitioner's sleep apnea and sciatica, Dr. Peterson
recommended:
OSA and Sciatica - for years, he has already been
accommodated for these challenging conditions in the form
of assignments for the Workforce Appeals Board which lend
themselves to review and preparation while being up and
mobile . . . . Emphasizing the use of'mobile mentation'
should continue to be mutually beneficial by optimizing his
output in both quality and quantity. Therefore, I
recommend that his assignments be selected in such a way
as to avoid, as much as possible, his functioning in [ ]
sedentary settings . . .
Id.
To address Petitioner's coronary concerns, Dr. Peterson stated:
CAD - in light of recent precipitation of chest pain by
a stressful work environment, I recommend a clear,
reasonable delineation of what comprises a full 40
hour work load for an experienced attorney in
[Petitioner's] specialty. Known and understood
expectations will eliminate a major source of stress.
Id.
At the Step 5 hearing, Dr. Peterson testified that he made
recommendations respecting proposed accommodations by asking Petitioner
what he believed he could do. R. 2137 at 423-24.
Dr. Peterson also testified: (1) that when he submitted the July 26
-14Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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letter, he did not know the purpose of Butler's questions; (2) that he performs
disability determinations "occasionally] at most;" (3) that he did not perform
any functional capacity testing to determine Petitioner's physical capacities;
(4) that he did not speak with any of Petitioner's supervisors to determine
Petitioner's job requirements; and (5) that he did not know the legal
definition of the term "essential function." R. 2137 at 403-407, 411; see 42
U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.
Dr. Peterson agreed that he did not know and that Petitioner did not
inform him (1) Petitioner was not required to sit for more than an hour at a
time when conducting administrative hearings; (2) most hearings were
conducted by telephone; and (3) by assigning Petitioner to conduct 20
administrative hearings per week, Downing had given him clear instructions
as to what constituted a forty-hour workweek. R. 2137 at 407-408.
Dr. Peterson stated that all of the information that he received
respecting Petitioner's job functions, working conditions, or workplace
hostility came from Petitioner. R. 2138 at 423-24.
Finally, Dr. Peterson testified that Petitioner was not disabled "from an
orthopedic standpoint." R. 2137 at 430.
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Chuck Butler denied Petitioner's accommodation request by letter
dated September 5, 2003. That letter reiterated Dr. Peterson's
recommendations that Petitioner receive job assignments that "[do] not
require [him] to sit for longer than an hour" and that Petitioner be given "an
assignment wherein [he had] a clear understanding of [workplace]
expectations." R. 2140ExA-6. Butler stated,
While we are not required to make an accommodation, I am providing
this information to Tani in the event she may want to consider the
doctor's request in making any future job assignments.
Id.
Downing was not involved in making Petitioner's ADA determination.
However, Butler did provide Downing with a copy of his letter. R. 2138 at
493-94; 2139 at 789, 818, 910.5
Petitioner's Change of Job Assignment
With Petitioner's grievance and accommodation requests being
resolved, Downing issued Petitioner a September 9, 2003 change in job
assignment memorandum. That memo assigned Petitioner to conduct

5

In December 2004, Petitioner filed suit in the Third District Court for
alleged ADA violations, among other claims. See Blauer v. DWS, Case No.
04092727. That court dismissed Petitioner's ADA claims in October 2006. R.
1761-1762. Petitioner also filed suit in federal court in July 2004, but he
voluntarily dismissed that case the following November. See Blauer v. DWS,
et al, U.S. District Court No. 2:04cv401.
-16Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

unemployment hearings on a full-time basis, but made clear that only his
duties were being altered, but that his job title, pay and benefits would
remain unchanged. R. 2140 Ex G-38.
Downing intended that change of assignment to meet both DWS's and
Petitioner's needs. The assignment allowed Petitioner to stand up or walk
around while performing his work, R. 2139 at 789, 790. It provided
Petitioner with clear expectations and enabled him to plan, organize and,
schedule his work week. And the assignment provided DWS with objective
criteria against which to judge Petitioner's performance. Id. at 790, 791, 796,
798, 799; 2140 Ex 38.
The physical demands for conducting hearings were light. Ninety-plus
percent of the hearings were done by speaker phone with the participants on
the phone. Most hearings lasted an hour, leaving Petitioner free to take
breaks or stand up at any time during the course of a hearing. R. 2139 at
764, 797.
Before assigning Petitioner to conduct hearings full-time, Downing met
with and considered job assignment proposals from Petitioner and Cantrell.
R. 2139 at 791-793; R. 2140 Exs G-32. Each of Petitioner's proposals included
a combination of duties, but few administrative hearings. R. 2140, G-32; R.
2138 at 510-512; 2139 at 793. Downing rejected the first option, comprised
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primarily of contribution work, because it would require Petitioner to sit for
more than an hour at a time and because Petitioner's performance would be
subjectively rated. R. 2139 at 794. Downing rejected the second option,
comprised primarily of Workforce Appeals Board work, because the board
chair previously complained to Downing about the quality of Petitioner's work
and had advised Downing that if Petitioner were given that assignment, the
chair would hire her own legal counsel. R. 2139 at 794-95; 782; 787-788.
In addition to those, Downing testified that she considered other
potential assignments, but rejected them because the performance evaluation
standards were based on subjective criteria. R. 2139 at 794-95.
Petitioner's assignment was neither permanent, disciplinary, nor a
corrective action. The assignment was also not made in retaliation for
Petitioner having filed a grievance or sought an accommodation. Id at 791,
796, 797, 801, 808, 845, 905, 908.
Petitioner's Second Grievance
Petitioner grieved this new assignment on September 12, claiming
among others, that it constituted a demotion. R. 2140 Ex G-40. On
September 26, Ireland granted Petitioner a hearing on that grievance,
although one was not required. R. 2139 at 841; 2140 Ex G-44. Immediately

-18Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

following that hearing, Petitioner went on sick leave and never returned to
work. R. 2140 Ex A-12; 2138 at 672, 673; see supra n. 6.
Ireland issued her Step 4 Decision denying Petitioner's second
grievance in October and found that the change of assignment did not
constitute a demotion. R. 2140 Ex G-44. Petitioner advanced his grievance to
Step 5.
Step 5 Proceedings
The CSRB administrator dismissed Petitioner's grievance for lack of
jurisdiction. R. 20-26. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, and for the first
time, raised six alleged personnel rule violations, three of which are the
subject of this action. R. 27-149.
The administrator denied Petitioner's request and Petitioner sought
judicial review in the district court. R. 276-282; 2140, Ex. A-13. The district
court agreed that DWS did not demote Petitioner and it dismissed that claim,
but the district court remanded Petitioner's personnel rule violation claims to
the CSRB for "consideration." R. Ex. A-14. Petitioner appealed that decision
here.
This Court affirmed the district court's finding that Petitioner was not
demoted. Blauer J, 2005 UT App. 488, \ 32. Later, Petitioner moved the

-19Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CSRB to set a hearing regarding the rule violation claims that the district
court had remanded. 6
The parties met informally to determine the issues to be adjudicated on
Step 5 and to set discovery dates. R. 1954. Thereafter, DWS moved to dismiss
the remanded claim because Petitioner had failed to grieve them at the
department level, and because the claims had been resolved in ancillary
proceedings. Id.
A hearing officer granted DWS's motion in December 2006 because "the
CSRB ha[d] no jurisdiction to go back and somehow hear claims not raised
with the proper entity more than three and one-half years ago. . ." R. 665,
1955-1956. The hearing officer also determined that Petitioner's July 2003
grievance resolved Petitioner's job performance parameter claim, R. 664,
1956, and that because in Blauer I this Court rejected Petitioner's complaint
6

In the time intervening Petitioner's appeal of his demotion grievance and
his request for a hearing to address the alleged personnel rule violations,
Petitioner took approved medical, FMLA, and long-term disability leave, and
never returned to work. See R. 1786; 2137 at 371, 379, 388; 2140, Ex A-18.
To retain employment following medical leave, Utah law requires an
employee to return to work within one year of starting that leave. See Utah
Admin Code. R 477-7-17. Petitioner did not return to work within that time
and on November 3, 2004 DWS terminated his employment. Petitioner
grieved that termination and it was upheld following a Step 5 evidentiary
hearing and a Step 6 appeal. Petitioner filed an untimely appeal of the Step 6
decision that this Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that it
could no consider the CSRB's decision upholding the termination. See Blauer
II, 2007 UT App. 280.
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that his supervisor had assigned him tasks outside of Petitioner's job, that
decision was res judicata and barred the CSRB from relitigating that issue.
R. 664-65; 1956; see Blauer /, 2005 Ut App. 488, f 32.
Petitioner appealed that dismissal here. This Court held that because
the district court had previously determined that Blauer had preserved his
personnel rule violation claims, the CSRB erred in dismissing them. The
Court remanded those claims for a hearing on the merits. R. 1956-1957,
Blauer II, 2008 UT App 84.
Prior to the Step 5 hearing and after considering memoranda from both
parties, the hearing officer ruled that the September 2003 change of
assignment memorandum did not constitute a written reprimand and that
DWS bore no burden to prove the basis for that memorandum. But the
hearing officer agreed to accept additional evidence or argument from
Petitioner to controvert that finding. R. 1456-1458.
The hearing officer conducted a Step 5 evidentiary hearing on
November 18, 19, 23, and December 7, 2009 regarding Petitioner's personnel
rule violation claims.7 At the conclusion of that hearing, the hearing officer
7

Petitioner raised six personnel rule violations on Step 5, but advanced only
three of those claims in his Step 6 appeal. Those are the only claims before
this Court and they include (1) DWS's alleged failure to define Petitioner's job
performance parameters in violation of Utah Admin Code R 477-10-1; (2)
DWS's alleged harassing and retaliatory conduct toward Petitioner in
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entered his finding of facts and conclusions of law, decision and order. R.
1566-1576. In relevant part, the hearing officer determined that: 1) DWS
appropriately defined Petitioner's job performance parameters in face-to-face
meetings between Petitioner and his supervisor and that Petitioner therefore
"suffered no harm" by DWS's failure to provide him with an updated
performance plan, R. 1574; 2) the CSRB lacked subject matter jurisdiction to
adjudicate Petitioner's disability discrimination claims, R. 1575; and 3)
Petitioner failed to meet his burden to show the change of assignment
memorandum constituted a written reprimand as a matter of law. R. 1574.
Petitioner appealed those rulings and advanced his grievance to Step 6.
R. 1616-1742. The matter was fully briefed and the CSRB held oral
argument on October 5, 2010. R. 1748-1826; 1831-1935.
On December 20, 2010 the CSRB issued its decision, order and final
agency action and upheld all of the findings and conclusions that the hearing
officer reached at Step 5. R. 1946-1974. In addition, the CSRB expressly
found that Petitioner failed to carry his burden to prove that DWS violated
the State's personnel policies against disability discrimination. R. 1969-70.
violation of Rules 477-15-2, -3; and (3) Petitioner's claim that the September
2003 change of job assignment memorandum constituted a "written
reprimand" grievable under Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-302(l) (West Supp.
2003). R. 1566-1576, Step 5 Decision and Order; R. 1946-1974 Step 6 Final
Agency Action.
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Summary Argument
The CSRB - and the Step 5 hearing officer before it - properly adhered
to this Court's mandate and conducted a hearing on the merits of Petitioner's
personnel rule violation claims. Thereafter, the CSRB correctly concluded
that DWS did not violate the State's general policy precluding discrimination
and unlawful harassment when DWS denied Petitioner's request for a
reasonable accommodation and thereafter, altered Petitioner's job duties.
But those findings were not necessary, because Petitioner lacks a private
right of action to substantively remedy a violation of those rules, thus
depriving the CSRB of jurisdiction to grant Petitioner specific relief.
The CSRB also correctly concluded that DWS adequately defined
Petitioner's job performance parameters in the several face-to-face meeting
that Petitioner's supervisor conducted. Too, DWS remedied Petitioner's
concern over the lack of performance plan when his supervisor provided
Petitioner with an updated plan and the executive director sustained
Petitioner's underlying employee grievance.
This Court previously upheld DWS's actions in issuing Petitioner a
change of job assignment memorandum and that decision is res judicata here.
Moreover, that memorandum, that merely altered Petitioner's day-to-day job
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functions, but did not effect his job title, pay, or benefits did not constitute a
written reprimand as a matter of law.
Finally, Petitioner failed to adequately exhaust his administrative
remedies respecting his claim that the hearing officer erred by excluding
Petitioner's rebuttal testimony, and this Court lacks jurisdiction to review the
same. But should the Court find that Petitioner preserved that claim,
Petitioner failed to show that the proffered testimony was in the nature of
rebuttal, or if it was, that its admission would have changed the outcome at
the CSRB below.

Argument
I.

The CSRB Correctly Dismissed Petitioner's Disability
Discrimination Claims.
A. The CSRB adhered to this Court's appellate mandate.

Petitioner contends the CSRB ignored this Court's prior mandate and
failed to conduct a hearing on the merits of Petitioner's claim that DWS
violated the State's personnel rules against unlawful discrimination and
workplace harassment. Petitioner is mistaken.
Following remand from this Court, the hearing officer conducted a
lengthy evidentiary proceeding on all of Petitioner's personnel rule claims,
including his claim that DWS retaliated against him in violation of Utah
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Administrative Code Rules 477-15-2, and -3. The hearing officer heard live
testimony from Petitioner and his physician and received documentary
evidence in support of those claims. The hearing officer did not deny
Petitioner the opportunity present evidence of alleged discrimination, but in
his findings and conclusions, he remarked that the "heart" of Petitioner's
grievance and the "bulk" of his evidence related to Petitioner's claim that
DWS discriminated against him by assigning him to conduct administrative
hearings on a full time basis. See R.1572, Step 5 Decision and Order at 7.
Converse to Petitioner's claim, the hearing officer did not revisit
whether Petitioner adequately preserved his discrimination claims - that
issue had already decided by the district court. Instead, the hearing officer
correctly determined that regardless of the evidence that Petitioner presented
on the merits, the UALD, not the CSRB, possessed the exclusive authority to
substantively remedy Petitioner's claim that DWS discriminated against him
based on an alleged disability. R. 1572-73, Decision and Order at p. 7-8 (citing
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-102 (dissatisfied with employer's discrimination
response, a grievant may file complaint with UALD); id. at § 34A-5-107 (filing
action with UALD under Utah's ADA provides "exclusive remedy" under state
law to redress disability discrimination); and Utah Admin. Code R. 137-1-5
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("The CSRB and CSRB hearing officers have no jurisdiction over
[discrimination] claims."))
Even if the hearing officer erred by not deciding8 whether Petitioner
proved the alleged rule violations, any error was remedied by the CSRB at
Step 6. See R. 1968-1970, Final Agency Action at 26-28. The CSRB expressly
noted and then meticulously adhered to this Court's mandate by reviewing all
of the evidence presented and finding that Petitioner did not meet his burden
to prove that DWS violated rule 477-15-2 or -3. Id. It was only after making
that determination, that the CSRB examined and then upheld the hearing
officer's jurisdictional order. R. 1970-71, Final Agency Action at 28-29.
Because that finding is correct, it should be upheld.
8

At pages 24 and 36 of his brief, Petitioner incorrectly states that the
hearing officer found Petitioner demonstrated that DWS violated those rules.
In part, Petitioner contends that the hearing officer's statement that "[t]he
evidence shows that DWS denied Mr. Petitioner's request for an
accommodation due to an alleged disability," equates to an express finding of
fact and conclusion of law that DWS engaged in unlawful discrimination and
harassment. See Petitioner Br. at p. 24. But that excerpt is plain on its face
and states only the hearing's officer's recitation of procedural facts;
Petitioner claimed to suffer from an alleged disability for which he sought an
accommodation that DWS denied. That excerpt neither states nor infers and the hearing officer was not called on to find - (1) that Petitioner is, in
fact, disabled as that term is defined by federal law; (2) that Petitioner was
entitled to a reasonable accommodation; (3) that the requested
accommodation was reasonable under the law or circumstances; or (4) that
DWS unlawfully or unreasonably denied Petitioner's request.
This Court should not permit Petitioner to make so much out of so
little.
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B.

The CSRB's factual findings are supported by substantial
evidence and its decision is reasonable and rational, 9

The CSRB correctly dismissed Petitioner's disability discrimination
claims because substantial evidence from the entire record supports the
CSRB's determination that DWS did not violate Rules 477-15- -2, or -3. This
Court should affirm.
1. Petitioner failed to adequately marshal the evidence
supporting the CSRB's factual findings.
The CSRB's factual findings should be affirmed because Petitioner has
failed to adequately marshal the evidence supporting them. "[T]he process of
marshaling the evidence serves the important function of reminding litigants
and appellate courts of the broad deference owed to the fact finder." State v.
Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738-39 (Utah App. 1990). Before the Court "will subject
an agency's findings to the substantial evidence test, the party challenging
the findings 'must marshal all the evidence supporting the findings and show
that despite the supporting facts, the [agency's] findings are not supported by
substantial evidence."' VanLeeuwen v. Indus. Comm'n, 901 P.2d 281, 284
(Utah App. 1995) (emphasis added) (quoting First Nat'l Bank v. County Bd. of

9

At page 24 of his brief, Petitioner erroneously contends that the CSRB
did not find that Petitioner failed to demonstrate discrimination under R.
477-15-2 and 3.
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Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 1990)) (bracketed material in
original).
Petitioner has attempted to meet that burden, but he has fallen short of
this Court's requirement. In argument, Petitioner underscored facts most
favorable to his position and ignored the other, contrary evidence.10 He thus
failed "show" that despite contrary evidence, the CSRB's findings have no
substantial support. See VanLeeuwen, 901 P.2d at 284. "This is not
adequate." Whitear v. Labor Comm% 973 P.2d 983, 985 (Utah App. 1998).
For that failure alone, the CSRB's factual findings are conclusive. See
Whitear, 973 P.2d at 985. The Court should affirm the CSRB's determination
that Petitioner failed to prove that DWS violated either rule guarding against
disability discrimination.
2. Substantial evidence supported DWS's actions.
Even still, substantial evidence supports the CSRB's conclusion that

10

Petitioner focuses largely on self-serving statistics that support his claim.
But even Petitioner agreed that in 2002 and 2003, the workload for all of
DWS's legal counsel increased, and further, that Petitioner did not know the
size of the caseload carried by his colleagues. R.2136 at 83-84; 2138 at 618-19;
2139 at 765-73; and R. 2140, Ex. A-25. Petitioner also laments that job
assignment memorandum represents Downing's failed attempt to place
Petitioner on corrective action. Downing and Campbell's testimony rebuts
that claim. R. 2139 at 791, 796-97, 801, 808, 905, 908. Moreover, this Court
has previously found the change of job assignment was proper and within the
scope of Petitioner's duties. Blauer 7, 2005 UT 488, f 32.
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DWS did not discriminate or retaliate against Petitioner in violation of Rules
477-15-2 and -3. Substantial evidence is "more than a mere 'scintilla' of
evidence and something less than the weight of the evidence." Johnson v. Bd.
of Review of Indus. Comm'n, 842 P.2d 910, 911 (Utah App. 1992). It is "that
quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a
reasonable mind to support a conclusion." Larson Limestone Co. v. State, 903
P.2d 429, 430 (Utah 1995) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Read in its entirety, the substantial evidence does not show that
Downing took action on September 9, 2003 to discriminate against Petitioner,
or because Petitioner sought a reasonable accommodation. Instead, that
evidence shows that Downing issued the change of assignment memo and
altered Petitioner's job functions to meet Petitioner's specific needs, and also,
to respond to a growing trend in DWS's workload and a spiraling trend in
Petitioner's ability to complete that work.
C.

Petitioner Lacks a Private Right of Action to
Substantively Remedy Disability Discrimination at
the CSRB.

But those findings, though correct, are inconsequential because
Petitioner lacks a private right of action to remedy disability discrimination
at the CSRB. Utah Administrative Code Rule 477-15 does not guarantee
Petitioner any substantive remedy at law; instead, that rule cites only the
-29-
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State of Utah's broad policy against unlawful discrimination. Petitioner
selectively quotes from Rule 477-15; for the Court's information and
convenience, DWS has provided a copy of the entire Rule at addendum A to
this brief.
That rule, entitled "Unlawful Harassment Policy and Procedure,"
contains six subsections, each with a separate heading. Rule 477-15-1,
entitled "Purpose" states
It is the State of Utah's policy to:
(1) provide all employee's a working environment that is
free from unlawful harassment based on race, religion,
national origin, color, sex, age, disability, or protected
activity under the antidiscrimination statute; and
(2) comply with state and federal laws regarding
discrimination based on unlawful harassment.
Utah Admin Code R. 477-15-1 (West Supp. 2003) (emphasis added). In turn,
R. 477-15-2, entitled "Policy" contains six subparts that 1) define the term
unlawful harassment; 2) describe the types of behavior that constitute
unlawful harassment; and 3) state that an employee who engages in unlawful
harassment shall be subject to corrective action or discipline, and may be
referred for criminal prosecution. Id. at R.477-15-2.
Subsection R. 477-15-3, entitled "Retaliation," provides that no person
may retaliate against an employee who opposes a practice barred under the
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policy, or who has filed a charge or participated in an investigative
proceeding. That subsection also states that an employee who engages in
unlawful retaliation shall be subject to corrective or disciplinary action. Id. at
R. 477-15-3.
Subsections R. 477-15-4 and -5 set out the proper complaint and
investigative procedures, respectively. And finally, subsection R.477-15-6
sets out the protocols for proper record keeping under the rule. Id. at R. 47715-4 to-6.
Bereft is any provision granting specific relief or a right of action to an
employed aggrieved by discrimination. Absent specific direction from the
language of a statute or rule, Utah's courts are loathe to imply a private right
of action. See Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12,120, 66 P.3d 592; see also Young
v. Salt Lake City Sch. Dist, 2002 UT 64, f 64, 52 P.3d 1234; J.H. v. West
Valley City, 840 P.2d 115, 125 (Utah 1992); Broadbent v. Bd. ofEduc. of
Cache County, 910 P.2d 1274, (Utah App. 1996). This reluctance, the Utah
Supreme Court has held, is particularly strong when the Legislature has
already designated a method of resolution through an administrative agency
specifically empowered to handle the issue. Miller, 2003 UT 12, f 20.
Here, a method to remedy unlawful disability discrimination exists.
The Utah Antidiscrimination Act, Utah Code Ann. § 34A-5-101 et seq.,
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prohibits discriminatory employment practices, and states that an appeal to
the UALD constitutes the "exclusive remedy" for an employee who has
suffered unlawful discrimination. Id. § 34A-5-107(15).
Moreover, a private right of action is one that belongs to a person,
individually, as opposed to being enforceable on behalf of a general
population. See Buckner v. Kennard, 2004 UT 78, \ 38, 99 P.3d 842; see also
Utah Admin Code. R. 477-15-1 (stating Utah's broad policy against unlawful
harassment). And even when a rule "grants a private right of action, the
scope of the right may not include all remedies." Buckner, 2004 UT 78, \ 38.
The thrust of Rule 477-15 is procedural. Its purpose is stated on its
face and includes the State's policy to provide its employees with a working
environment free from discrimination or unlawful harassment, and states the
procedures a state agency must follow when a charge of discrimination is
made. Petitioner does not seek to enforce that general policy; he seeks,
instead, back pay, benefits and attorney fees. Nothing on the face of the rule
states or implies such a remedy.11 But those damages can be obtained, if at
all, by first complying with Utah's Antidiscrimination Act. The CSRB's

11

Conceivably, the only substantive remedy available under Rule 477-15 is an
action to subject an employee who violates that policy to discipline or
corrective action. See Utah Admin. Code. R. 477-15-2(3), -3(2).
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decision is sound and based on a plain reading of the rule. It should be
affirmed.
D.

The CSRB Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction to
Substantively Adjudicate Disability Discrimination
Claims.
1. Only the UALD possesses jurisdiction to remedy
unlawful harassment and discrimination.

The CSRB correctly determined that Utah's Antidiscrimination and
Labor Division, not its Career Service Review Board, is vested with the
subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate workplace discrimination claims.
The CSRB correctly dismissed Petitioner's disability discrimination claims.
That decision is sound and should be affirmed.
Utah's Personnel Management Act dictates the procedures that a
career service employee who alleges unlawful discrimination or harassment
must follow to remedy that claim. See Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-32 (West
2003). At its core, the Act directs the employee to initiate a complaint to the
UALD, not the CSRB:
(1) A[] . . . career service employee . . . who alleges a
discriminatory or prohibited employment practice as defined in
Section 34A-5-106 may submit a written grievance to the
department head where the alleged unlawful act occurred.
(2) Within ten working days after a written grievance is
submitted under Subsection (1), the department head shall issue
a written response to the grievance stating his decision and the
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reasons for the decision.
(3) If the department head does not issue a decision within ten
days, or if the grievant is dissatisfied with the decision, the
grievant may submit a complaint to the Division of
Antidiscrimination and Labor, pursuant to Section 34A-5-107.
Id.
In turn, the Antidiscrimination and Labor Act, Utah Code Ann. § 34A5-107 (West Supp. 2003), reiterates those procedures, and states further that
they constitute, "the exclusive remedy under state law for employment
discrimination based upon . . . (i) disability." Id. at § 34A-5-107(15) (emphasis
added); See Buckner, 2004 UT 78, f 37 (appeal to the UALD constitutes the
"exclusive remedy for an employee claiming a violation of the statute.").
Finally, the Utah Personnel Management Rules make clear that the
CSRB has no jurisdiction to substantively remedy discriminatory or
prohibited employment practices. But Rule 137-1-5 states, in unmistakable
language, that the CSRB has not jurisdiction over disability discrimination
claims:

>

Claims alleged to be based upon a legally prohibited practice as
set forth in Section 34A-5-106, including employment
discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, pregnancy,
childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, age, if the individual
is 40 years of age or older, religion, national origin, or disability,
are not admissible under these grievance procedures. The CSRB
and CSRB hearing officers have no jurisdiction over the preceding
claims.
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Utah Admin Code R. 137-1-5(1) (emphasis added).
A plain reading of those statutes and rules supports the CSRR's
jurisdictional decision. That decision should be upheld here.
2. Jurisdiction has not already been decided by this Court,
Petitioner claims this Court previously vested the CSRB with
jurisdiction to substantively remedy his discrimination claims. That claim is
without merit. See Blauer III, 2008 UT App. 84.
In Blauer III, this Court determined that Petitioner's rule violation
claims were "preserved." Id. The Court did not address or express any
opinion respecting whether the CSRB possessed jurisdiction to substantively
remedy Petitioner's discrimination claims. But this Court found that the
CSRB had erred "by considering jurisdictional issues that have already been
decided by the district court." Id.
The CSRB's authority and the scope of its jurisdiction is determined by
the legislature, not the courts. See Utah Code § 67-19a-202; see also Olson v.
Utah Dept of Health, 2009 UT App 303, 221 P.3d 863. The legislature has
expressly defined and limited that jurisdiction by statute.
"[A] lack of jurisdiction can be raised by the court or either party at any
time." Bradbury v. Valencia, 2000 UT 50, f 8, 5 P.3d 649. At Step 5, the
hearing officer properly addressed this jurisdictional question and correctly
-35-
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concluded that "the CSRB is without jurisdiction to hear" and "is without
authority to review [Petitioner's] claims of discrimination, including
retaliation." R. 1572-73, Decision and Order at 7-8. The CSRB correctly
determined that decision was not erroneous. R. 1969-71, Final Agency Action
at 27-29. DWS urges the Court to do the same.
II.

The CSRB Properly Dismissed Petitioner's Job
Performance Parameters Claim.

Petitioner's July 2003 employee grievance addressed his job
performance standards and Petitioner's complaint that he was "working
under a performance plan that was put in place some years ago."12 R. 2140
Ex. G-39. Downing promptly considered and resolved that claim when she
gave Petitioner a new performance plan on June 18, 2003. Id. at Ex G-33.
And prior to that, Downing made Petitioner aware of his job assignments and
DWS's expectations in weekly meetings that she held with Petitioner in 20022003. Despite those facts — that Petitioner must accept - he claims the CSRB
erred when it found that DWS satisfied the substantive provisions of Utah
Admin. Code R. 477-10-1. But the CSRB's decision is correct.

12

Petitioner prevailed on that grievance and, presumably because he won, he
did not appeal from Agency Director Ireland's decision. R. 2140, Ex G-39;
2139 at 840:18-23.
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A. Substantial evidence supports the CSRB's findings and
conclusions.
Petitioner received annual performance evaluations during his
employment. R. 2138 at 606. In most years, those evaluations successfully
rated Petitioner's performance. But in 2001 and 2002, Petitioner's
supervisors, Smith and Downing, respectively, began to note a downward
trend in Petitioner's work. They brought that concern to Petitioner's
attention. R. 2140, Exs. G-13 & G-14.
In 2001, Petitioner did nothing to challenge that statement; but he
agreed with Smith's evaluation. R. 2140, Ex. G-13 at p. 3. In 2002, Petitioner
responded:
I consider the Performance Evaluation process now utilized
to be flawed and demoralizing. To help solve the problem,
since I best understand my job and the dynamic
fluctuations of my workload, I will conduct an analysis of
my position and identify the elements of the job, reasonable
standards of performance and criteria for evaluating my
performance for my supervisor's consideration. I will then
meet with my supervisor to discuss a resolution. In the
meantime, I appreciate my weekly meetings with Tani to
discuss my work assignments thereby helping her
understand what I do.
R. 2140 Ex G-15 at 2. Petitioner failed to offer DWS with input
regarding the elements of his job or performance standards.
Petitioner had a performance plan in place in 1999-2000 and 2000-
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2001. R. 2140, Ex A-2; Ex G-34. That plan was not updated for 2001-2002,
but Petitioner was neither aware of this fact, nor did he complain about it. R.
2138, 613:24-25, 614:1-2. And despite having challenged DWS's
"[performance [evaluation process as flawed" in June 2002, Petitioner took
no steps to learn or complain of the fact he also had no new performance plan
in 2002-2003. R. 2138 at 617:24-25, 618:1-18.
Despite the lack of a renewed plan, prior to and after Petitioner's June
2002 performance evaluation, Downing met weekly with Petitioner weekly in
2002 and 2003 "to discuss [his] work assignments:"
Q. After the 2002 performance review that you had with Mr. Blauer
that's memorialzed in G-14, did you schedule weekly meetings with
Mr. Blauer to review his work?
A. Yes.
Q. In those meetings with Mr. Blauer, did you discuss performance
expectations?
A. Yes.
R. 2139 at 777:8-15.
And within days of submitting his July 2003 grievance, Downing gave
Petitioner a 2003-2004 performance plan. R. 2140, Ex G-17; Exhibit G-33.
Petitioner admits that plan was substantively the same as his prior
performance plans. R. 2138
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Petitioner also admits that the part of his July 2003 grievance that
complained of the lack of current performance plan was resolved when he
received that plan:
Q. You admit that the part of your first grievance that no current
performance plan was in place was resolved?
A. Yes. She brought me that - that 2003-2004 performance plan and so
that would be a performance plan,
R. 2138 at 656:21-25; 657:1.
The hearing officer correctly concluded that although DWS may have
been dilatory in providing a performance plan, "Mr. Blauer suffered no harm
from the failure and any claim for relief due to the omission is moot."13 R.
1753, Decision and Order at 9. And on that evidence, the CSRB correctly
upheld the hearing officer's conclusion that "[Blauer's] job performance
parameters were properly defined." R. 1966-67, Final Agency Action at 24-25.
Those findings are correct and the CSRB determination was reasonable and
rational. Petitioner's challenge to his job performance parameters should be
denied.

13

In response to Petitioner's Step 4 grievance, Executive Director Ireland
gave Petitioner the "benefit of the doubt," that the lack of a current
performance plan drove Petitioner's performance problems. Ireland therefore
elevated Petitioner's performance rating to "successful." R. 2140 Ex. G-39.
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III.

The CSRB Correctly Determined That the September 9,
2003 Job Assignment Memorandum Was Not a Written
Reprimand

A written warning or other memorandum constitutes adverse, or
disciplinary action "only if it affects a significant change in [Petitioner's]
employment status." Haynes v. Level 3 Commc'ns, LLC, 456 F.3d 1215, 1224
(10th Cir. 2006); see also Tapia v. City of Albuquerque, 170 Fed. Appx. 529,
2006 WL 308267 at *3 (10th Cir. Feb. 10, 2006) (what constitutes adverse
action "is inherently fluid and fact-based," but "a mere inconvenience or an
alteration of job responsibilities will not suffice."). Here, Downing's
September 9, 2003 memorandum altered Petitioner's day-to-day job
assignment, but not his job title, benefits, or rate of pay. That memorandum
did not change Petitioner's employment status. It also did not constitute a
written reprimand. The CSRB's similar conclusion is correct. It should be
affirmed.
A. Res Judicata Bars This Claim,
The CSRB lacks jurisdiction to review non-disciplinary action. The
CSRB possesses jurisdiction to review disciplinary action, such as dismissals,
demotions, suspensions, and written reprimands. See Utah Code. Ann. § 6719a-202(l)(a). Petitioner first challenged the change of assignment
memorandum in September 2003, and claimed that it constituted a demotion
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a disciplinary action subject to the CSRB's jurisdiction. The CSRB
Administrator disagreed and he dismissed that grievance. Petitioner sought
judicial rev ievv in the state district court ' I here , the court determined the
n i i M i m r n n d i m i ilnl nnl < 1m1 Jil ill mlc .1 (Icinol ,1011 mull iiil I n dismissed IVIilmm'i',•.

grievance. Dissatisfied, Petitioner appealed the district court's determination
here, This Court found the change memorandum was not a demotion, i.e., it
was not a disciplinary action , but a proper allocation of employee resources.
See
Thai

1

'

b i n d i n g 0111 I V I i l m n n

mull l ) W S

"\II 1 ill

precludes Petitioner from challenging the change memorandum for a second
time here.
The doctrine of res judicata promotes the i-iaiit\ *»t luu^mem- nid
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that J. court's linal decision on an issue actually litigated and necessarily
decided in a previous suit is conclusive on that issue in subsequent litigation.
hi

lll"1 .i I-.T2, .sVt' R E S T A T E M E N T S * « *.

OGMENTS

§ 27 (198^ > The
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parties of the cost and vexation 01 inuliipie suits, conserve judicial resources,
and encourage reliance on judgments

3 ^
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Issue preclusion applies when (1) the issue previously decided is
identical with the one presented in the action in question, (2) the prior action
has been fully adjudicated on the merits, (3) the party against whom the
doctrine is invoked was a party to the prior adjudication, and (4) the party
against whom the doctrine is raised had a full and fair opportunity to litigate
the issue in the prior action. See id.; also Youren v. Tintic School District, 86
P.3d 771 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 94 P.3d 929 (Utah 2004). Each element is
satisfied.
The CSRB's decision and this Court's order Blauer I constitute a final
adjudication on the merits of Petitioner's demotion (disciplinary) claim. The
parties are identical in each action. The prior proceedings afforded a full and
fair opportunity to litigate the issue at controversy here. And, the
determinative issue - whether the change memorandum was disciplinary or a
proper exercise of DWS's discretion - was decided by the CSRB and this
Court.
The Court should bar Petitioner's attempt to challenge the change of
assignment memorandum for a second time, but the Court should bar that
claim.
B. Public Policy Bars Petitioner's Claim.
Previously, this Court also recognized that sound public policy belies
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Petitioner's claim:
Our decision is buttressed by the adverse policy implications of
concluding that DWS demoted Blauer. First, a decision in favor of
demotion could limit a supervisor's capability to alter responsibilities
based on changing department needs within a given set of job functions,
hindering management's flexibility. Second, a finding of demotion
would place limitations on an employer's ability to make probationary
assignments. Finally, in making a demotion determination, we would
provide employees with a means ol claiming ^demotion" anytime an
employer assigns them to a task they ^u- * - I<M- or wish to perform.
Id. at f 35.
Those policy considerations apply w ith equal force here Toe • thej are
shmired by oihnr <niii (,,',,
In Holt v. Bd ofEduc. OfWebutuck Central Sch. Dist, 52 N.Y.2d 625,
634 (N.Y. 1981), the N ew York Court of Appeals considered Holt's claim that
a letter she received Iron i a school administrator that was critical of Holt's
performance -.•..-•..: .;. ,.

•

; :'

.M\ MI bin J I o appeal. Ri ; jc ding1

[C]ritical evaluations . . . M l within the permissible range of
administrative evaluation. While the language of the
administrators' letter may appear to some to be in the nature
of a "reprimand" within,, the literal meaning of the word, it falls
far short of the sort of reprimand contemplated by the sta tiite
Although the sharply critical content of the letter is
unmistakable, the purpose of such communications - to CL
the teacher's attention a relatively minor breach of school
policy and to encourage compliance with that policy in the
future - is also clear. The purpose is to warn, and hopefully to
instruct - not to punish.
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Holt, 52 N.Y.2d at 634. The court continued,
Such an informal warning serves, we believe, as a useful tool
to help the administrator correct minor problems before they
grow into major ones. Should [an administrator] be deprived
of this informational means of policy enforcement, one of two
situations will ultimately prevail. The [administration] must
either overlook all minor infractions and allow them . . . or
must initiate a formal disciplinary action to remedy [them] ...
Surely, the Legislature has not expressly limited [the agency]
to a policy choice between extremes of permissiveness and
strictness. Common sense dictates that another, more
moderate, option should be available.
Id. at 633.
Even in the sole case that Petitioner cites, the court recognized the
practical difference between issuing a reprimand and giving constructive
criticism. That case, Gordon v. Horsley, 86 Cal.App.4th 336, 102 Cal. Rptr.2d
910 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001), is at once distinguishable from and beneficial to the
ruling at issue here.
There and as part of larger employment action, Gordon, a deputy
sheriff, received a letter from the county sheriff that "went beyond criticizing
Gordon; it specifically removed privileges that are accorded other peace
officers." 102 Cal.Rptr.2d at 917. That did not simply warn; its restrictions
were strictly enforced against Gordon, resulting in '"disadvantage, harm, loss
[and] hardship"' Id. at 918. Despite that fact, the California court
commented that not all written comments from an employer rose to such a
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level. But the court recognized the difference between a "performance
evaluation containing negative comments," and imposition of "specific
restrictions" on an employee's powers as result of "misconduct " ' 1 d at 91 9.

Pet ; • - •

' »ugh that memorandum

contained comments, critical in nature, those comments were meant to
"warn" Petitioner of problematic job performance and to guide him, to an
acceptable alternative.

P

. '

: r!r \, (Miiisconduct. But the record

makes clear that Downing issued the memorandum to meet DWS's and
Petitioner's needs. The CSRB's conclusion is sound, reasonable and rational.
The Court should afctn
IV,

The CSKJB's decision to preclude Petitioner's rebul I ail
testimony w a s not reversible e r r o r b u t Petitioner
failed to p r e s e r v e t h a t claim.

'Petitioner contends the Step 5 hearing officer committed reversible
error when he precluded Petitioner from offering his rebuttal, testimony
Beyond thai bald assertion, IViitioiHT has Jinl shnwn lllial I lie litaii in;,;
otTicfi "f. mlii'ii)';' was orrnr, or m"l

HI

\\\\\ ml ivas hat infill

Ilul \\\\r (-ouii'l

IMMMI

not address this claim because by failing to advance it to Step 6, Petitioner
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did not exhaust his administrative remedies in the CSRB below.
A. Petitioner Failed to Exhaust His Administrative Remedies
and this Court Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction to Review
this Claim.
In Utah, a party protesting agency action must exhaust all
administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief. The purpose of that
doctrine is "to allow an administrative agency to perform functions within its
special competence - to make a factual record, to apply its expertise, and to
correct its own error so as to moot judicial controversies." Horn v. Utah Dep't
of Public Safety, 962 P.2d 95, 99 (Utah App. 1998).
Here, the Grievance and Appeal Procedure Act (GAPA) expressly limits
the CSRB's and a reviewing court's subject matter jurisdiction to matters
properly exhausted in the agency below. See Horn, 962 P.2d 95, 99 (Utah
App. 1998) (GAPA explicitly prohibits judicial review of employee grievance
when employee fails to process grievance in timely manner.) Unless an
employee can show excusable neglect, "if the employee fails to process the
grievance to the next step within the time limits established by this part, he
has waived his right to process the grievance or obtain judicial review of the
grievance." Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-401(4)(a) (West 2004). But "'[w]here
the legislature ha[s] imposed a specific exhaustion requirement, courts will
strictly enforce it." Salt Lake City Mission v. Salt Lake City, 2008 UT 31, f 6;
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see also Patterson v. An i. Fork City, 2003 UT 7, f 17, 67 P.3d 466 ("[s]trict
enforcement

dictates that if a party Tails to exhaust [its] administrative

remedies prior to filing suit, the suit must be dismissed.'" (citation omitted).
Although i.'iiisnl on appeal, IViit

IOIRM

illull iiiiial axlhaasl Ins

officer's evidentiary determination at Step u. Petitioner has accordingly
waived any challenge to the hearing officer's ruling. That failure to strictly
adhere to G A <
• .\ .-» statutory framework deprives this Court of jurisdiction
o\ i i i Pc >titi< )i*

I;uin
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Court should dismiss if.
B. The Hearing Officer's Decision to Preclude
Petitioner's Rebuttal Testimony that Was Irrelevant
and Argumentative was Not Error.
Rebuttal i nii-ii^ , '^vick ma. tending L
ol l"iai"wist1 MI

. *

u.a . riioa.i,, exp^m. or

' ^ •-" ' "i '

'

- -'

Louder { 2001 UT 62, % 2Q 89 P.3d 638 (quoting Handle v. Alien, 862 P.2d
1329, 1338 (Utah 1993)). Petitioner's proffered testimony was not offered to
rebut Downing's testimony about jobs that she considered, but rejected in
2(Hhi Instead, lliial k'stitiioiry wii.s niilniilnl f iM"\plajii

Irom IVtilionu ,'<

have performed in September 2003. The hearing officer appropriately
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concluded that testimony was not germane to decisions that DWS reached,
and about which Petitioner first complained, six years prior. The hearing
officer properly precluded it.
Should this Court find that the proposed testimony was proper rebuttal,
the hearing officer's decision should stand. Utah law is clear that an
"erroneous decision to admit or exclude evidence does not constitute
reversible error unless the error is harmful." Jones v. Cyprus Plateau Mining
Corp., 944 P.2d 357, 360 (Utah 1997) {quoting Jouflas v. Fox Television
Stations, Inc., 927 P.2d 170, 173 (Utah 1996)). A harmful error occurs where
"the likelihood of a different outcome in the absence of the error is
'sufficiently high so as to undermine confidence in the [final decision].'" Id.
(quotation omitted). Conversely, an error is harmless when although properly
preserved below and presented on appeal, the error is sufficiently
inconsequential that the there is no reasonable likelihood [it] affected the
outcome of the proceedings. State v. Villarreal, 857 P.2d 949, 958 (Utah App.
1993) (emphasis added).
Here, Petitioner and his physician testified at length respecting
Petitioner's alleged limitations and need for a workplace accommodation.
And while under direct examination, Petitioner identified and explained the
several recommendations that he proposed, but that Downing rejected in
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August 2003. Si le R. 2133 at 509 51 2. Even the hearing officer remarked
that the "heart" of Petitioner's evidence and the ""'"bulk'1' of his evidence and
testimony rega rded his disability claims Tin at is for naught, because
Petitioner did not to offei at Step 5, and he has to point here, to any evidence
thai I >\VS discriminated aii;aiiin( linn v\L n < "liiii IL Hull In* rejected lui i
accommodation request and Downing appropriately reallocated Petitioner's
job functions.
TV

-tition<~-r,~ attempt, in 2009, to offer evidence of an accommodation

thai
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t

• .

nor

*:<"

--

change
' liscrefinn

reversible error. The Court should affirm it.

CONCLUSION
Petitioner has failed to carry his burden to show the CSRB erred by
denying his personnel rule violation claims. liul the US Kb s decision and
onlri and iinnl agency action i,s leasonnMe, iiali mal, .mull correct in .mil
respects. Accordingly,, the Court should affirm it.
DATED this 9th of June, 20 i I

ttyqwW
BRIDGET K. ROMANO
Assistant Utah Attorney General
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R477. Human Resource Management, Administration.
R477-15. Unlawful Harassment Policy and Procedure.
R477-15-1. Purpose.
It is the State of Utah's policy to:
(1) provide all employees a working environment that is free
from unlawful harassment based on race, religion, national origin,
color, sex, age, disability, or protected activity under the antidiscrimination statute; and
(2)
comply
with
state
and
federal
laws
regarding
discrimination based on unlawful harassment.
R477-15-2. Policy.
(1) Unlawful harassment means discriminatory treatment based
on race, religion, national origin, color, sex, age, protected
activity
or
disability.
Discrimination
based
on
unlawful
harassment will not be tolerated.
Violators shall be subject to
corrective action or disciplined and may be referred for criminal
prosecution. Discipline may include termination of employment.
(2) Unlawful harassment includes the following subtypes:
(a) behavior or conduct in violation of R477-15-2(l) that is
unwelcome,
pervasive,
demeaning,
ridiculing,
derisive,
or
coercive, and results in a hostile, offensive, or intimidating
work environment;
(b)
behavior or conduct in violation of R477-15-2(l) that
results in a tangible employment action being taken against the
harassed employee.
(3)
The imposition of corrective action and discipline is
governed by R477-10-2 and R477-11.
(4)
An employee shall be subject to corrective action or
discipline for unlawful harassment towards another employee, even
if that harassment occurs outside of scheduled work time or work
location, provided that the harassment meets the requirements of
R477-15-2(2).
(5) Individuals affected by alleged unlawful harassment may,
but shall not be required to, confront the accused harasser before
filing a complaint.
(6)
Once a complaint has been filed, the accused shall not
communicate
with
the
complainant
regarding
allegations
of
harassment.
R477-15-3. Retaliation.
(1) No person may retaliate against any employee who opposes
a practice forbidden under this policy, or has filed a charge,
testified,
assisted
or
participated
in
any
manner
in
an
investigation, proceeding or hearing under this policy, or is
otherwise engaged in protected activity.
(2) Any act of retaliation toward the complainant, witnesses
or others involved in the investigation shall be subject to
corrective action or disciplinary action.
Prohibited actions
include:
(a)
open hostility to complainant, participant or others
involved;
(b)
exclusion or ostracism of the complainant, participant
or others;
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(< *
ireation of or the continued existence of a hosti le work
environment;
(d)
discriminatory
abuui
the
complainant,
r e m a r ] ^ s
participant or others;
(e)
special attention to or assignment of the complainant,
participant or others to demeaning duties not otherwise performed;
(f) tokenism, or patronizing behavior;
(g) discriminatory treatment;
(h) subtle harassment; or
(i)
unreasonable supervisory imposed time restrictions on
employees in preparing complaints or compiling evidence < :>f
unlawful harassment activities or behaviors
R477 15-4. Complaint Procedure,
I ndi vi dua Is
affected
by
ui ll aw L ^... haras sment
may
f i1e
complaints and engager in an administrative process free from bias,
collusion, intimidation or retaliation.
(1)
Individuals who feel they are being subject-..
unlawful harassment should do the following:
(a) document the occurrence;
(b) continue to report to work; and
(c) identify a v/itness, if applicable.
(2) An employee may file an oral or written complaint of
unlawful harassment with their immediate supervisor, any other
supervisor within their direct chain of commamd, the agency human
resource officer or the Department of Bnnia Resource Management
<r3) Any complaint of unlawful harassment shall h& a •* •;<
•--Lug receipt of the complaint.
. a) Complaints may be submitted . • -•:- nd . vidual, \ ifj--:: -:
volunteer or other employee.
(b) Complaints may be made throu-j:'* -irner verbal •j _ .vr.ri^:
notification
and
shall
be
handled
in
compliance
with
confidentiality guidelines.
(c) Any supervisor who has knowledge of unlawful harassment
shall take immediate, appropriate action and document the action.
(4)
If an immediate investigation by the agency is not
warranted, a meeting shall be held with the complainant, the
supervisor or manager of the appropriate division, and others as
appropriate
to
communicate
the
findi ngs
and
management's
resolution of the comp1aint.
R477-15-5. Investigative Procedure.
(1)
The investigative procedures established by agencies
shall allow the complainant to make specific requests relating to
the investigation process and about the person or persons who will
conduct the investigation.
The agency shall attempt to comply
with these requests, but may take whatever action necessary and
appropriate to resolve the complaint.,
(2) Preliminary reviews and investigations must be conducted
iii accordance with procedures issued by the Department of Human
Resource Management
(3) Results of Investigation
(a) If the investigation reveals th^i disciplinary action is
warranted, the agency head shall take appropriate action as
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provided in R477-11.
(b) If an investigation reveals evidence of criminal conduct
in unlawful harassment allegations, the agency head or Executive
Director, DHRM, may refer the matter to the Attorney General's
Office or County or District Attorney as appropriate.
(c)
If an investigation of unlawful harassment reveals that
the accusations are unfounded, the findings shall be documented,
the investigation terminated, and appropriate parties notified.
(d)
Investigations
shall
be
conducted
by
qualified
individuals based on DHRM standards.
R477-15-6. Records.
(1)
A separate protected record of all unlawful harassment
complaints shall be maintained and stored in the agency's human
resource office, DHRM office or in the possession of an authorized
official.
Removal or disposal of records in the protected file
may only be done with the approval of the agency head or Executive
Director, DHRM, and only after minimum timelines specified herein
have been met.
Records shall be kept for:
a minimum of three
years from the resolution of the complaint or investigative
proceeding.
(2)
Supervisors shall not keep separate files related to
complaints of unlawful harassment.
(3) All information contained in the complaint file shall be
classified as protected pursuant to requirements of Section 63-2304, Government Records Access and Management Act.
(4)
Information
contained
in the unlawful
harassment
protected file shall only be released by the agency head or
Executive Director, DHRM, when in compliance with the requirements
of law.
(5) Participants in any unlawful harassment proceeding shall
treat all information as protected.
(6) Final disposition of unlawful harassment cases shall be
communicated to appropriate parties.
R477-15-7. Training.
(1)
Agencies shall comply with the Unlawful Harassment
Prevention Training Standards set by DHRM.
As a minimum, these
shall contain:
(a) course curriculum standards;
(b) training presentation requirements;
(c) trainer qualifications; and
(d) training records management criteria.
KEY: administrative procedures, hostile work environment
Date of Enactment or Last Substantive Amendment: July 3, 2001
Notice of Continuation: June 11, 2002
Authorizing, and Implemented or Interpreted Law:
67-19-6; 67-1918; ; Governor's Executive Order on Sexual Harassment, March 17,
1993
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